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This article is excerpted and adapted with
permission from "The Majoritarian Difficulty:
Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law"
(University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 62 No. 2,
1995). All references have been omitted. Readers
who wish to obtain a copy of the original should
contact the LQN editor.
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MAJORITARIAN

DIFFICULTY
Legal academicians are typically
preoccupied with the work product of
judges appointed for life. While the
preoccupation may be understandable, it
clouds a fact that may be surprising: A
majority of all cases in the United States
are decided by judges whose continued
tenure is contingent upon elections. This
fact is attributable to another: Most
judgeships in the United States are
elective offices. More than surprising,
these two facts are curious, even anomalous, for judges are elected on a similar
scale in no other constitutional democracy in the world.
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Notwithstanding the prevalence of
elective judiciaries and the enormous
influence that elected judges exercise on
the daily operation of the United States
justice system, the institution has received scant theoretical attention. This is
not to say that no one has ever thought
about the desirability of elective
judiciaries.To the contrary, the debate
about "getting judges out of politics"
emerges almost perennially, fueled in
large part by controversies surrounding
elected state judges. But that debate
(whose participants, incidentally, often
are sitting or former state judges or
justices themselves) is confined largely to
issues such as the propriety of judicial

campaigning and the effects of attorney
expenditures on judicial objectivity.
Yet none of the arguments proposing
to do away with the institution, by itself,
leads to its conclusion. Other, less
sweeping corrections - public financing
of judicial campaigns, for example would avoid the types of problems
precipitating those reforms. Why dismantle the institution rather than remove
its warts? On the other hand, if elective
judiciaries are otherwise undesirable,
why resist reforms that would eliminate
them? Why is the institution worth
preserving? The debate about judicial
politics does not often address these
larger normative questions.

This article begins to confront such
questions. It asks whether any compelling theoretical justification - specifically, one compatible with any of several
prominent models of judicial review can be given in defense of elective
judiciaries. It asks whether and how
elective judiciaries advance or undermine
some of the fundamental principles of
constitutional democracy. And unlike
past criticisms of elective judiciaries, it
exposes one danger the institution poses,
even assuming that judicial elections are
entirely free of corruption and that
campaign contributors do not enjoy illicit
influence with their elected judges.
It does so by presenting and examining a puzzle inverse to the one Alexander
Bickel articulated, for which he coined
the phrase "the countermajoritarian
difficulty." The countermajoritarian
difficulty concerns judges' power to
invalidate majoritarian policies when
they are neither placed in office by the
majority nor directly accountable to the
majority. Bickel asked, in effect: "How
can a nonelective judiciary be justified in
a democratic regime?" He and others
have provided several different answers
to that question, many of which in one
way or another attempt to reconcile the
institution of a nonelective federal
judiciary with democracy.
This article considers the opposite
problem - call it the "majoritarian
difficulty" - a problem so far largely
overlooked. The majoritarian difficulty
asks not how unelected/unaccountable
judges can be justified in a regime
committed to democracy, but rather how
elected/accountable judges can be
justified in a regime committed to
constitutionalism. For constitutionalism
entails, among other important things,
protection of the individual and of
minorities from democratic governance
over certain spheres. When those
charged with checking the majority are
themselves answerable to, and thus
influenced by, the majority, we may
question how individual and minority
protection is secured. Judges who
safeguard a minority contrary to the

wishes of a majority, for example, can be
defeated in the next election and replaced
by judges more attuned to majoritarian
will.
And, according to several sources,
judicial elections have become increasingly salient in recent years, and judicial
candidates have consequently been
subject to increasing electoral-political
pressures. Thus, former Justice Otto Kaus
of the California Supreme Court ex-

judges to political pressures. According
to Hamilton, an independent judiciary
constituted the "citadel of the public
justice and the public security." His
argument is uncompromising: "Periodical
appointments, however regulated, or by
whomsoever made, would, in some way
or other, be fatal to [the judiciary's]
necessary independence."
Half of a century later, Alexis de
Tocqueville joined Hamilton by suggest-

IT DOES SO BY PRESENTING AND EXAMINING A
PUZZLE INVERSE TO THE ONE ALEXANDER BICKEL
ARTICULATED, FOR WHICH HE COINED THE PHRASE
"THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY."
THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY CONCERNS
JUDGES' POWER TO INVALIDATE MAJORITARIAN
POLICIES WHE;N THEY ARE NEITHER PLACED IN
OFFICE BY THE MAJORITY NOR DIRECTLY
ACCOUNTABLE TO THE MAJORITY. BICKEL ASKED,
IN EFFECT:

"How

CAN A NONELECTIVE
JUDICIARY BE JUSTIFIED
IN A DEMOCRATIC REGIME?"
plained in an April 1987 ABAJournal
article called "The Politics of Judging":
'Tm afraid the era of retaining judges
on the basis of their character, without
tallying up their votes, is a thing of the
past. There's no way a judge is going to
be able to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if
he or she has to make them near election
time."
Justice Kaus might overstate the
matter, but perhaps by not as much as
many might expect. While democratic
values may be advanced by subjecting
judges to increased electoral scrutiny,
certain constitutionalist values may be
compromised at the same time.
In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton
argued that permanence of tenure, which
he considered to be a great virtue of the
proposed federal judiciary, would avoid
many ills associated with subjecting

ing that some states' then-emergent
practice of subjecting judges to periodic
elections was tantamount to an attack on
"the democratic republic itself." But can
Hamilton and Tocqueville possibly be
right? Do we really believe that periodic
appointments for judges - specifically,
"appointments" by election - are fatal to
their independence and, thus, to democracy itself?
This article argues that Hamilton's and
Tocqueville's claims are, though perhaps
hyperbolic, not ill-conceived: At least for
contemporary constitutional democrats,
elective judiciaries pose certain conceptual problems. Of course, unless Justice
Kaus is right that elected judges are in
fact responsive to electoral pressures, the
majoritarian difficulty remains "only" a
theoretical problem. While there are
reasons to think that voters in judicial
elections might be typically less informed
LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES
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about judicial candidates' positions on
salient legal and constitutional questions
than about other political candidates'
positions, nevertheless the electorate's
response (actual or expected) to judicial
candidates' legal positions and past
rulings sometimes shapes judicial
behavior significantly. Furthermore,
when the majoritarian difficulty is
understood broadly to include voters'
influence not merely on judges' positions
on particular constitutional questions but
also on their legal positions and judicial
predispositions, the problem, though
very difficult to measure empirically,
might be very real indeed.
A few important caveats are in order at
the outset. First, the analysis that follows
depends upon the assumption that
contemporary constitutionalism entails a
commitment to the protection of individual and group rights from political
majorities. Second, this article focuses
only on judiciaries in which judges are
subject to periodic election. Systems of
judicial selection according to which
judges are elected for life terms may not
pose the same problem as those identified here, certainly not to the same
degree. Third, this article assumes that
the recent increased salience of judicial
elections is not entirely attributable to
increased voter interest in the integrity
and competence of judicial candidates.
It assumes, in other words, that many
voters in salient judicial elections vote
not simply for the most honest and able
candidate, but on the basis of candidates'
ideological identities, attitudes toward
criminal defendants, and views or rulings
on capital punishment, abortion rights,
pornography, and so on. Finally, although the primary aim here is to show
that elective judiciaries seem at odds with
certain constitutionalist commitments,
one cannot conclude that elective
judiciaries are therefore illegitimate or
undesirable. Elective judiciaries may
come with certain advantages that
outweigh the disadvantages identified
here, and alternative systems no doubt
come with their own sets of problems.
50
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THE MAJORITARIAN
DIFFICULTY

The countermajoritarian difficulty
begins with the observation that judges
are not electorally accountable. When
judges are electorally accountable,
however, that difficulty fades away and a
new one appears. Yet, somehow the new
difficulty has received no attention. Some
have rightly noted that elective judiciaries
might avoid the countermajoritarian
difficulty, but scholars have failed to
consider the majoritarian difficulty which
is implicated whenever judges are
influenced by democratic pressures.
But the problem presented by assigning the task of constraining the majority
to the unelected judge, daunting as it
may be to the democrat, may be no more
daunting to the constitutionalist than the
problem presented oy assigning the task
of constraining the majority to the judge
whose faces reelection. Indeed, if
Hamilton and Tocqueville were right that
electorally independent judiciaries are
"indispensable" to the public justice and
the preservation of the "democratic
republic itself," then the problem may be
insoluble.
•
Elective judiciaries pose two problems for the constitutional democrat.
First, the rights of individuals and
unpopular minority groups may be
compromised by an elective judiciary.
Second, and more mundane but no less
important, the impartial administration
of "day-to-day" justice may be compromised.
Insofar as the outcomes of judicial
elections are dependent on majoritarian
attitudes concerning individual or
minority constitutional rights, these
rights may be compromised. An elected
judge may perceive that a majority of the
judicial electorate opposes vindicating
some (federal or state) constitutional
right when its violation is suffered by
some disfavored minority group. Vindicating individual or minority constitutional rights might prove too much for

judges for whom reelection is important.
Unscrupulous judges seeking reelection
would have an incentive to compromise
the constitutional rights of subsets of
their judicial electorate who are unpopular, unorganized, or otherwise outvoted.
Scrupulous judges who refuse to respond
to majoritarian pressures may as a result
be removed from office and replaced
with unscrupulous judges. Over time,
this phenomenon would create a systemic bias in favor of judges most
responsive to majoritarian pressures.
Examples are easy to imagine. A judge
perceived by an electorate to be too
vigilant in the protection of constitutional
procedural rights of accused criminals
may be targeted for electoral replacement
by a majority of the judicial electorate.
Particularly when the problem of crime is
considered to constitute a crisis, as it
seems to be at present, judges may feel
significant pressure not to safeguard all
constitutional protections. The protection
of abortion rights in judicial districts
where abortion is disfavored by a
majority is another example where the
protection of constitutional rights may be
threatened by electoral accountability.
Yet the majoritarian difficulty extends
beyond core constitutional interests of
disenfranchised groups. In Federalist 78,
Hamilton explained two functions that .
the federal judiciary would serve. As well
as protecting against "ill humors," the
federal judiciary would also ensure the
unbiased administration of day-to-day
justice. An elective judiciary threatens
this second role as well. For one example, a judge given discretion by law to
sentence convicted criminals by considering such factors such as the number and
type of past convictions, the severity of
the way the particular offense was
committed, the character of the convicted, and so on, may exercise that
discretion not with reference to these
factors alone, but instead to demonstrate
her tough posture toward crime and thus
to win continued favor from a majority
necessary for reelection. This is not to say
that if the majority legislatively removed
the judge's discretion or even imposed

penalties as harsh as the reelectionminded judge would have imposed, such
an exercise of majoritarian power would
be illegitimate. It is rather to say that
electoral pressures that lead the judiciary
- the very institution charged with
reviewing majoritarian responses to
"crises" and preserving the rule of law to sentence convicted criminals according
to criteria not prescribed by law compromise commitments to the rule of law. In
nonconstitutional cases, the rule of law is
compromised whenever a judge rules
differently from the way she would have
had electoral considerations not been
taken into account.
In two ways, then, elective judiciaries
threaten the rule of law, sometimes the
rule of supreme law. When a court is
influenced by majoritarian political
pressures incident to reelection, it
exercises judicial power, not to protect
the litigant, but against him or her. That,
without mystic overtones, is what
actually happens. It is an altogether
different kettle of fish, and it is the reason
the charge can be made that judicial
review by elective judiciaries threatens
the rule of law.

however, highly salient issues do come to
dominate judicial elections. Moreover,
judges who are candidates in lowsalience elections are likely to be influenced by political pressures generated by
high-salience elections. Both phenomena
advance democracy, but they raise new
questions concerning constitutionalism.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
MAJOR IT ARIAN DIFFICULTY

One might fairly question whether the
majoritarian difficulty is of any practical
significance. To what extent are elected
judges really influenced by the immediate
majority? Answering that question is very
difficult, given that the consequences of
the majoritarian influence seem likely to
take ulterior forms, making its measurement problematic if not impossible.
It seems safe to say that elected judges
typically have not been highly responsive
to the electorate. To the contrary, there
are compelling reasons to believe that
judges' constituents often have known
little about the individuals for whom they
have voted. Judicial elections, in other
words, have often been democratic only
in a sterile, formalistic sense. At times,

TO WHAT EXTENT ARE
ELECTED JUDGES REALLY
INFLUENCED BY THE
IMMEDIATE MAJORITY? . ..

• Open elections and universal suffrage
against a background of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press are at
the core of any democratic system. On
these criteria, judicial elections have long
been formally democratic. Judicial
elections are open, suffrage is nearly
universal, and candidates, supporters,
and detractors enjoy the freedom to
vocalize and print their views. In practice, however, lack of information about
judicial candidates has seriously complicated the connection between voter
preferences and judicial candidates'
positions.
Two sets of constraints explain this
lack of voter information. On the "supply
side," legal constraints, ethical obligations, and professional norms restrict the
extent to which judicial candidates can
supply potential voters with information
about themselves. Judicial candidates are
discouraged from communicating to
potential voters how they would decide
particular legal questions. Although these
prohibitions do not always prevent
judicial candidates from disclosing their
views on salient issues, presumably they
have some effect.
On the "demand side," voters have
traditionally had very little incentive to
gather information about judicial candidates. First of all, as compared to candidates for legislative or executive office,
the "policy" jurisdiction of judges has
traditionally been relatively limited.
Consequently, the likelihood that a given
judicial candidate would render a
decision affecting any given voter is
small. Thus, even a voter who might
anticipate being a party to a future case
would have little incentive to vote for a
judicial candidate. This holds true even
for judges in the lowest tier of a state
judicial system, since trial courts often
have several judges and a voter would
thus have to discount her vote by the
probability that she would appear before
the judicial candidate and not some other
judge on that court. While the policy
jurisdiction of candidates to appellate
courts is greater, the voter must still
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discount the impact of her vote by the
probability that the candidate's presence
will be decisive on a particular appellate
panel.
It seems highly likely that most voters
in judicial elections are not self-interested
in the sense that they vote in anticipation
of appearing before a winning candidate,
however. Rather, like voters in other
types of elections, they vote to fulfill their
duties of citizenship, to participate in the
making of history, and to express their
philosophical commitments and policy
preferences. Still, even ideologically
committed voters have probably had less
incentive to participate in judicial
elections than in other elections, as long
as judges' policy jurisdictions remained
small and insofar as supply-side constraints restricted voter access to information about judicial candidates.
At least until recently, empirical
observation seemed to corroborate these
expectations about voter participation in
judicial elections. Potential judicial voters
in fact seemed to have little inclination to
vote. Empirical work revealed that actual
voter turnout was often modest. In the
rare states where judicial elections are not
contemporaneous with elections for
legislative and executive officers, voter
turnout was smaller still.
It is worth noting, however, that in all
judicial elections some voters have shown
up at the polls. This raises the question
whethe.r those who vote in judicial
elections are, with respect to their
preferences among judicial candidates,
representative of citizens generally. If so,
then most citizens might benefit from the
heightened sense of civic responsibility or
greater ideological commitment of those
who vote, in which case the outcomes of
judicial elections cannot necessarily be
considered undemocratic, no matter how
low voter turnout might be; only those
judges who would be elected if all
citizens voted would in fact be elected by
a representative subset of citizens.
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Moreover, while the constraints described above may severely limit the
availability of information about judicial
candidates in the typical judicial election,
not all judicial elections are in fact
typical. To the contrary, judicial elections
occasionally are highly salient, sometimes
focusing on a single issue or small set of
issues and mobilizing large segments of
the citizenry.
Much more important, there are
indications that judicial elections simply
are not the dreary events they used to be.
According to several former or sitting
state judges and many commentators,
judicial elections are more and more
often high-salience events that mobilize
large portions of the citizenry. The
incidence of judicial incumbent electoral
defeats has increased, while the electoral
victory margins of judicial winners have
decreased. In the re<;ent words of one
student of judicial elections: 'Judicial
races used to be quiet or not even races,
but more states are seeing them become
nosier, nastier, and costlier."
The 1986 electoral defeat of three
justices of the California Supreme Court,
largely in response to their positions on
the constitutionality of the death penalty,
is a clear example of how elected judges
are increasingly accountable to electoral
majorities. One might object that
California's 1986 judicial elections
constitute an extreme case from which
generalizations cannot be easily drawn,
but the example is by no means unique.
In that same year, chief justices of the
North Carolina Supreme Court and of
the Ohio Supreme Court also lost
elections. Incumbent supreme court
justices in other states -New Mexico,
West Virginia, and Wyoming, for
example -have also been defeated in
recent elections. In still other states,
incumbent justices have been reelected
only after highly contested races. A
Florida chief justice, for instance, recently defeated a challenger in a salient
retention election in which he was
opposed by groups such as the Florida
Right to Life, Citizens for a Responsible
Judiciary, and the American Family

Association, groups which vowed to
participate actively in future judicial
elections in that state.
Media coverage of lower court elections is often limited, which makes
estimating the salience of lower court
elections and thus the effects of electoral
considerations on lower court judges
difficult, but one would expect electoral
pressures to operate there too. Recently
in Texas, for example, two incumbent
lower court judges lost elections following a write-in campaign initiated to
unseat a judge who had ordered restrictions on antiabortion protests at clinics.
The threat of majoritarian influence also
manifested itself in the widely publicized
"Korean grocer case" in Los Angeles. In
that case, Soon Ja Du was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter for fatally
shooting Latasha Harlins, a fifteen- yearold black youth accused of shoplifting
from Du's store and assaulting Du. Judge
Joyce A. Karlin of the Los Angeles
County Superior Court sentenced Du to
five years' probation. The sentence was
considered unusually lenient by segments
of the public, who had seen televised
portions of the grocery store's videotape
showing Harlins beating Du and Du
shooting Harlins as Harlins walked away.
Public outcry at Judge Karlin's sentence,
sparked in part by comparisons to the
then-recent Rodney King case, led to a
campaign to defeat Judge Karlin in her
impending reelection bid.
In the end, Judge Karlin was reelected.
But the example illustrates the political
pressures to which lower court judges are
sometimes subjected. And the effects of
such pressures seem likely to be significant systematically - that is, not just for
those judges directly involved in salient
elections. Thus, when Judge Karlin's
reelection was still in doubt, one of her
judicial colleagues reportedly remarked
off the record: 'There is no way I can give
straight probation because I don't want to
be the next Joyce Karlin."

Some scholars have inferred from the
fact that incumbent judges are rarely
defeated that majoritarian influences on
elective judiciaries must be negligible.
Such an inference is precipitous. It rests
on the faulty premise that majoritarian
pressures would manifest themselves
only in the form of electoral defeats, and
it overlooks the possiqility that high
reelection percentages may be the result
of significant majoritarian pressure. One
can conclude from a high reelection rate
that judges are insulated from
majoritarian pressures no more than one
can make the same conclusion about
members of Congress who rarely lose
reelection bids. Incumbent legislators
typically lose only a small percentage of
elections, but majoritarian influences on
their decision is not only real, but
significant, as much research shows.
Because majoritarian influences on the
judiciary are likely to be at least partially
concealed, high reelection rates do not
demonstrate the insignificance of the
majoritarian difficulty.

• Some scholars hold strong to
traditional liberal models of judicial
review according to which the judiciary
advances, not impedes, the majoritarian
principle. As mentioned, arguments that
seek to reconcile judicial review with the
majoritarian principle often take one of
three paths. The principal alternatives are
representation-oriented, participationoriented, and rights-oriented models.
Bickel's own resolution of the difficulty was rooted in the idea that the
federal judiciary is, fundamentally, a
representative institution. He begins with
the distinction between expediency,
which implicates the majority's interests,
and principle, which implicates its
values. The function of the federal
judiciary is to protect principle against
expediency's attacks. The judiciary, in
contradistinction to the other two
branches, is to "be the pronouncer and
guardian of ... values." In this role, the
judiciary represents the majority.

But this is not the end of Bickel's
argument. To explain why the judiciary's
representative claims should trump the
other two branches' representative
claims, he ultimately turns back to his
fundamental premise that political
legitimacy is grounded solely in
majoritarian consent. The judiciary, that
is, invokes principle as a constraint on
majoritarian sentiment where, but only
where, in the foreseeable future, principle
will gain majoritarian support. In short,
the federal judiciary negotiates the
tension between the majority's shortsighted preferences, represented by the
legislative and executive branches, and
those principles the majority will come to
embrace in the longer term. The
countermajoritarian difficulty is overcome, then, since majoritarianism is
ultimately preserved, protected by an
unaccountable judiciary.
Bruce Ackerman ci'ffers a somewhat
different solution, also grounded in the
representatives of the judiciary.
Ackerman argues that the
countermajoritarian difficulty is overcome by rejecting its implicit "leveling"
premise. According to the leveling
premise, one political decision commands no more normative weight than
another, no matter the context or institutional structure through which that
decision is made. A decision reached by
an impassioned legislature is no more or
less legitimate than one reached by a
court or a referendum.
But, Ackerman argues, such a
conflation misunderstands the nature of a
constitution and fails to appreciate
important differences across democratic
institutions. Constitutional decision
making must be distinguished from the
decision making performed by "everyday" political institutions. Whereas
everyday politics involves adjudication
among private (selfish) interests, "higher"
politics - the politics of constitutional

decision making - involves instead the
dialog creation of the citizenry's political
identity, including the principles that are
to guide public life. As such, its importance trumps that of everyday politics.
Ackerman overcomes the
countermajoritarian difficulty by arguing
that it is the judiciary which, in times of
everyday politics, preserves the political
identity the majority forged for itself in
past times of high politics. In this sense,
the judiciary represents the majority's
better self, a self too easily lost in the
throes of everyday politics. Whereas
Bickel characterizes the judiciary as the
institution that represents the identity the
majority will come to have, the principles
it will in time embrace, Ackerman's
judiciary represents the identity the
majority has already forged, the principles to which it has previously committed. As representative of the citizenry's
enduring principles and, thus, of its
identity, the judiciary is in fact a democratic institution.
Notwithstanding their important
differences, Bickel's and Ackerman's
resolutions of the countermajoritarian
difficulty thus both involve reconciliation
of constitutionalism with democracy on
the grounds that judicial review advances
democracy by ensuring that the
majority's long-term, constitutive values
are represented in the heat of the moment. This model leaves no room for
elective judiciaries, however. According
to Bickel and Ackerman, the judiciary's
closer connection to the higher will of the
majority legitimates the exercise of
judicial power. Where judges are themselves products of electoral politics, they
are no longer specially attuned to the
majority's higher will. More important,
the representation-oriented model of
judicial review precludes any resolution
of the majoritarian difficulty. This is true
because that model distinguishes between higher/more authoritative and
lower/less authoritative majoritarian will.
Elective judiciaries erode that distinction,
with devastating consequences. Where
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UNLESS THE
MAJOR ITARIAN
DIFFICULTY IS NOT
RESOLVABLE, EFFORTS
TO MAKE JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS MORE
DEMOCRATIC SHOULD
MEET LITTLE
RESISTANCE .
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judicial power is contingent on low-level
majoritarian will, individual and minority
rights are no longer secured against the
momentary throes of everyday politics.
Thus, according to the model's premises,
there simply can be no resolution of the
majoritarian difficulty. Because the
original justification for the protection
principle is fidelity to high-politics
majoritarian will, subordinating that will
to low-politics majoritarian will undermines majoritarian democracy as well as
constitutionalism.
In contrast to representation-based
accounts of judicial review, others resolve
the countermajoritarian difficulty by
arguing that the judiciary safeguards the
principle of democracy by ensuring that
democratic decision-making processes
are in some sense truly democratic. On
this view, there is nothing
countermajoritarian ~bout an institution
that insists that legislative outcomes
reflect the will of a majority of all citizens. Without such an institution, some
citizens may successfully exclude others
from decision-making processes. Unchecked democrats, in other words, may
threaten democracy. The judiciary's role
is to guard against such threats by
ensuring, that policy decisions are arrived
at through democratic processes, as set
forth in the Constitution.
This account of judicial review is
commonly associated with its chief
proponent, John Hart Ely. Ely analogizes
judicial review to antitrust law. Antitrust
principles interfere with the market when
some market participants have an unfair
advantage. So too with the judiciary, on
Ely's account. The judiciary monitors the
political "market" to ensure not that its
allocations are fair or just, but that those
allocations were arrived at fairly and
justly, with no market distortions.

The judiciary alone, Ely argues, is the
proper institution to assume this role.
Other branches cannot be trusted to
safeguard the democratic processes, since
they might profit from distortions of
those processes. Thus the unelected
judiciary is uniquely qualified to safeguard democratic decision-making.
Judicial review, thus understood, easily
comports with democracy's majoritarian
principle. Once again, the
countermajoritarian difficulty is resolved.
This participation-oriented model of
judicial review offers no promise of
resolving the majoritarian difficulty
either. According to this model, the
exercise of judicial power is legitimate
precisely because judges are not
electorally accountable. Where judges
themselves are answerable to majorities,
there is no longer any institution positioned to provide a check on majoritarian
will. This means that democratic majorities may compromise democratic political
processes by disenfranchising political
minorities. Without an institution to
safeguard political participation rights,
democracy can unravel. Thus, as with the
representation-oriented model, here an
elective judiciary is not only irreconcilable with constitutionalism, but seriously
threatens genuine majoritarianism as
well.
Whereas Ely's account of judicial
review would have the judiciary protect
democratic processes, others would have
the judiciary also review the substance of
democratic decisions. According to
adherents of this position, the judiciary
should not be understood to be merely a
referee, but should sometimes invalidate
legislative outcomes on grounds independent of the processes by which those
outcomes were reached. Specifically, the
judiciary can and must invalidate legislation in violation of individuals' moral
rights as embedded in the Constitution.

Ronald Dworkin represents this
school. Dworkin rejects the argument
that the federal judiciary should defer to
the electorally accountable branches on
questions of political morality, on the
grounds that such a view is predicated
either on the misguided belief that
"decisions about rights against the
majority ... ought to be left to the majority," or on a profound and untenable
skepticism toward the existence of rights
against the state. Neither of these,
according to Dworkin, is faithful to the
premises underlying the majoritarian
principle or, indeed, to the form of
democracy established by the Constitution.
According to Dworkin, the American
conception of democracy presupposes
that individuals have moral rights against
the government, which is to say, against
the majority. Judicial protection of those
moral rights is not troubling, Dworkin
argues. In fairness, decisions about what
rights the individual possesses against the
majority should not be left to the majority. Thus, the judiciary, which is not
accountable to the majority in the same
way that elected officials are, should not
simply defer to the other branches about
the scope of protected constitutional
rights. Instead, adherence to the Constitution requires that the judiciary enforce
constitutional protections against the
majority by explicating the scope of those
rights based on reasons of principle and
according to the judiciary's own moral
insight, even against competing explications of those rights by the more accountable branches.
Once again, the countermajoritarian
difficulty is resolved, at least indirectly.
Where democratic processes produce
results that violate the protection principle, it is not illegitimate for judges to
invalidate those results, because what
makes democracy normatively appealing
in the first place is that it treats people as
moral and political equals. Can this
model resolve the majoritarian difficulty?
The introduction of an elective judiciary
transforms it into a majoritarian institution, so putting the task of interpreting

individuals' constitutional rights to the
judiciary is in effect putting the majority in
charge of deciding what rights are possessed against it, which according to the
argument is unfair. Here once again, then,
the protection principle is irreparably
compromised by an elective judiciary, so
the majoritarian difficulty is unresolvable
by the model. What is more, an elective
judiciary also threatens democracy, in the
specific sense that it divests democracy of
its normative appeal. Because democracy
is desirable only insofar as it preserves
moral equality among individuals, and
because such preservation is possible only
insofar as some institution not directly
accountable to the majority can protect the
individual from the majoritarian threats to
moral equality, an elective judiciary clips
democracy from its normative roots. A
democracy that cannot preserve the moral
rights of its citizens is-no longer entirely
appealing.

problematic even if, indeed especially if,
election results smoothly reflect
majoritarian will.
Second, this article has argued that the
majoritarian difficulty is not easily
resolvable. The logic of antidemocratic
models suggests that increased judicial
accountability is desirable. They seem to
overlook the majoritarian difficulty,
however, which, this article has further
argued, suggests that something important is missing from them. Other models
recognize the difficulty, but their logic
suggests that accountable judiciaries
undermine commitments not only to
judicial constitutionalism but to
majoritarian democracy as well. According to these models of judicial review, the
unelected status of the judiciary is exactly
what preserves their legitimacy in a
democratic regime. Thus, all leading
models of judicial review considered here
either fail to recognize the difficulty, or
suggest that the difficulty is insoluble.
The desirability of elective judiciaries
is therefore open to serious question.
How elective judiciaries advance both the
CONCLUSION
majoritarian principle and the protection
principle simultaneously is unclear. This
This article has sought to accomplish
is
true even in low-salience elections
two primary and two incidental goals.
where
elected judges are, as a practical
Above all else, it has sought simply to
matter,
unaccountable to majorities. For
identify the majoritarian difficulty.
in
such
instances, the institution adFollowing what many consider to be the
vances
the
majoritarian principle only in
increased politicization of the selection of
a
very
formal
and attenuated sense.
judges, recent years seem to have seen
Unless
the
majoritarian
difficulty is not
increasing salience in the selection of state
resolvable,
efforts
to
make
judicial
judges as well in those many states where
elections
more
democratic
should meet
judges are elected. Judicial elections are no
little
resistance.
longer always formalities. Judicial incumNor does the institution seem desirbents in many states can no longer count
able
on the grounds that it produces
on electoral victories. Consequently, it
more
capable judges; or that it adds
seems that at least some judges in elective
democratic
legitimacy by creating the
states are beginning to respond to
exaggerated
perception that "the people"
majoritarian political pressures. To the
really
control
those who exercise judicial
extent that judges are sensitive to such
power
over
them;
or that it provides
pressures, commitments to constitutionalbetter
access
to
members
of groups
ism and, more generally, to the rule of law
historically
underrepresented
in the
may be jeopardized. Critics as well as
judiciary.
Each
of
these
justifications
is
supporters of elective judiciaries have
either
theoretically
dubious
or
empirioverlooked this fact: the institution is
cally groundless, or both.
Elective judiciaries are illegitimate and
should be dismantled forthwith .
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Such unambivalent conclusions are
always tempting, but the temptation must
be resisted here. Perhaps one who would
preserve the institution can now step
forward and explain how electorally
accountable judiciaries really advance
constitutionalist commitments - how, in
short, the majoritarian difficulty may be
resolved. After all, although this article
has considered important representatives
from conservative, liberal, and progressive
camps, it has not considered every model
of judicial review. Maybe some model not
considered here could make more sense
of elective judiciaries vis-a-vis constitutional democracy's fundamental principles. Alternatively, perhaps a defender
of the institution can explain how state
judiciaries function within state systems
in ways fundamentally different from
their federal counterpart - how, that is,
state constitutional democracies are
different from the federal constitutional
democracy in ways that implicate the
function of state judiciaries and that argue

in favor of electorally accountable
judiciaries. Or, perhaps a defender can
explain how elective judiciaries, though
historically designed to extend the
people's control over those who wield
political power, today bring unanticipated benefits, other than superior judges
or a more diverse judiciary. Or, perhaps
it can be shown that by and large voters
in judicial elections behave quite differently from voters in other elections in
that they select candidates based on
assessments of their integrity and ability
alone. Finally, it might be that while this
article's analysis is entirely sound,
lifetime appointment (or lifetime election) of judges poses problems more
serious than the majoritarian difficulty,
such that, all things considered, elective
systems are best. At least until these or
similar arguments are made, however,
judicial reform movements already
underway, as in Georgia, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Texas, now have one
new argument to commend them.
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